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The international framework agreement concluded between the Spanish fashion retailer 
Inditex SA and the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers Federation 
(ITGLWF) was lauded as the first IFA to apply to an outsourced apparel supply chain. 
Central to the implementation approach of both parties is an understanding that for progress 
to be made in the advancement of core labour standards in producing countries, compliance 
efforts need to be rooted in the promotion of freedom of association, dialogue and collective 
bargaining. This approach has informed the interventions of the ITGLWF and the 
multinational Inditex SA to resolve trade union recognition disputes in a number of 
developing countries. This article presents and critically examines an early test case of this 
approach at a knitwear factory in Cambodia.  Drawing on empirical research, we find that the 
intervention resulted in the resolution of a recognition dispute, which led to significant 
membership gains for a local union and the removal of fixed duration contracts. However, the 
article raises questions about the effectiveness and sustainability of such an approach for 
advancing freedom of association and collective bargaining throughout a multinational 
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Multiple forms of exploitation and denial of fundament rights at work continue to be 
widely documented and condemned by Global Union Federations (GUFs) and human rights 
NGOs, particularly in the context of outsourced garment, textile and apparel supply chains. 
The lack of such rights stem from relaxed labour laws and from processes of global 
restructuring which have accelerated the relocation of mass production and conferred global 
buyers – brands, retailers and export traders – the power of pitting against each other an 
increasingly large number of Asian, African and Latin American suppliers competing to attract 
steady orders. As explained by Barrientos (2008: 982), by relying on outsourced production, 
buyers are able ‘to exert pressure on suppliers to reduce costs, reduce lead times and increase 
just-in-time efficiency.’ Trickling down the supply chain is a downward pressure on labour 
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conditions manifested in ‘job insecurity, poverty wages, long hours, unhealthy working 
conditions, abusive management, child labour and the suppression of trade union rights’ 
(Miller 2004: 219). 
Against this background our paper analyses the implementation of the first 
International Framework Agreement (IFA) signed between a multinational in the sector – in 
this case the Spanish fashion retailer Inditex SA and the International Textile Garment and 
Leather Workers Federation (ITGLWF). A more detailed analysis of the evolution and 
content of this agreement, signed in 2007, has been carried out elsewhere (Miller, 
forthcoming). Here, we are concerned to use a case study approach to appraise the 
introduction of a series of collective agreements in an Inditex supplier as means to resolve a 
number of code violations. The choice of River Rich, one of Inditex’s main Cambodian 
suppliers of knitwear, is not random, and is seen as constituting a test case for the industry 
(See: Oka 2010: 71). River Rich is in fact one of the first factories where the ITGLWF and 
Inditex have facilitated the negotiations of agreements which contain clauses for the 
management of labour relations and the respect of core labour conventions. In charting the 
labour disputes at the River Rich factory and their subsequent resolution, we unravel the 
tensions in employment relations in a country that has been rapidly enmeshed in the 
globalisation of garments production. We argue that transnational solidarity and the 
intervention of Inditex and the ITGLWF to install what has been termed ‘a mature industrial 
relations approach’ did indeed bring about some positive changes in employment relations and 
trade union recognition at the factory. However, the fickle nature of outsourced apparel 
production raises serious questions about the overall effectiveness and long-term sustainability 




Corporate Social Responsibility and Trade Union Rights  
 
The working conditions of garment workers in the global South mirror those 
experienced in Western sweatshops almost a century ago and, perversely, in the remnants of 
production facilities still to be found in a number of buying countries today. The fundamental 
problem for organised labour is that those social gains which garment workers in the North 
managed to secure through unionisation, hard-fought collective action and collective 
bargaining, were lost at the point of relocation of production to the South, posing significant 
barriers for garment workers to organise and advance their rights. Lipschutz (2005: 76) 
summarises the hindrances to freedom of association in three key propositions: ‘capital views 
unionisation as an obstacle to efficiency and profits; states worry that labour activism will 
drive capital away; and workers fear – with good reason – that attempts to organise will get 
them fired’. Even in countries where freedom of association and collective bargaining are 
permitted, restrictions to unionisation and strikes are often sanctioned in labour law, and 
employers’ trade union busting techniques are not infrequent. The situation on the ground is 
further complicated by employer sponsored alternative forms of worker representation 
purporting to satisfy freedom of association code principles and intransigence to engagement 
in collective bargaining. For the workers, on the other hand, ‘yellow unions’ are often the only 
safe channels for representation in the workplace (ITUC 2007a). 
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The regulatory gap, arguably resulting from the lack of an ILO enforcement 
mechanism and some countries engaging in a regulatory race to the bottom in an effort to 
remain competitive in a post-quota world, has been progressively supplanted by the emergence 
of soft regulatory mechanisms operating under the banner of ‘corporate social responsibility’ 
(CSR). Spurred by the emergence of the second ‘anti-sweatshop’ movement and consumer 
pressure, throughout the past two decades, reputation conscious multinational corporations 
(MNCs) have resorted to the adoption of codes of conduct and participation in non-
governmental systems of labour standards monitoring (Jenkins, Pearson and Seyfang 2002, 
O’Rourke 2003). Codes, whether at the level of the firm, within sector specific or cross-
sectoral initiatives, draw upon international standards and conventions that MNCs are 
expected to uphold throughout their supply chains. A number of assessments on the efficacy 
of codes as tools for the advancement of core labour standards in the global South have just 
begun to emerge. Echoing the concerns of number of earlier studies (Pruett 2005; Locke, Fei 
and Brause 2006), Wells (2007: 65) in a seminal review on the impact of codes and 
monitoring mechanisms argues that ‘overall, and notwithstanding evidence of improved code 
compliance among some first-tier suppliers, especially in respect to child labour, forced labour 
and health and safety...there is considerable evidence that code compliance remains weak and 
monitoring largely ineffective.’ 
Significantly, within the emerging system of voluntary regulation, trade union rights 
continue to remain an area of political contention and limited impact. O’Brien (2002) 
explains that for some corporations, including one of the global retailers involved in the River 
Rich case, trade union rights are not corporate responsibilities but political matters, the 
jurisdiction of which rests solely within states. When freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining become enmeshed in private CSR interventions and codes of conduct, 
recent studies confirm that very little progress has been made by transnational buyers or local 
firms to guarantee or enable unionisation.  In a survey of six high-profile initiatives addressing 
freedom of association and collective bargaining in  transnational supply chains,1 Clean 
Clothes Campaign (CCC) finds that social audits were incapable of finding, reporting, or 
remedying violations of freedom of association (CCC 2005). In the aftermath of the CCC 
report, an empirical study conducted by Barrientos and Smith (2006) on the impact of the 
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) Base Code in South Africa, Vietnam, India and Costa Rica 
also observed limited impact in relation to freedom of association, discrimination, regular 
employment and harsh treatment, where serious issues frequently remained. Similar 
considerations transpire from Koçer and Fransen’s (2009) study on the impact of codes in 
three Turkish apparel manufacturers. They observe that codes are unlikely to lead to 
remarkable improvements in freedom of association and collective bargaining, but they qualify 
that they might provide some protection when there is nothing else to rely on (Koçer and 
Fransen 2009: 254). Taken together, these recent empirical findings appear to confirm the 
existence of an enduring disjuncture between MNCs’ commitments to trade union rights and 
decent work, as enshrined in codes of conduct, and the reality of trade unions’ rights in the 




New Instruments of Social Compliance for the Advancement of Trade Union 
Rights 
 
The only existing instruments of global social compliance that position freedom of 
association and collective bargaining at the centre of relations between organised labour and 
MNCs are the proliferating International Framework Agreements. Setting the IFAs apart from 
codes of conduct are four characteristics identified by Hammer (2005: 218):  
 
[IFAs]...establish a platform for international industrial relations in 
defining GUFs legitimate bargaining partners. They clearly move 
beyond codes of conduct in that they are not mere unilateral 
declarations, but contain obligations, although not legally enforceable 
ones. In addition, they deal with government failure by setting global 
minimum standards and by getting MNCs to accept some 
responsibility for the labour rights situation throughout the supply 
chain. Finally, labour is one of the main actors in the implementation 
as well as a regular monitoring process. 
 
Although the ITGLWF has been a latecomer in the negotiation of an international 
framework agreement (Miller 2004, Miller 2008) it has consistently positioned trade union 
rights and industrial relations as a cornerstone in its understanding of the role of an IFA. 
Whereas in some quarters, IFAs may be conceptually understood as ‘soft accountability 
mechanisms under the banner of corporate social responsibility’, (Papadakis 2008: 2, 
Croucher and Cotton 2009: 61) most Global Unions understand their purpose as an enabling 
instrument for upholding fundamental rights at work and specifically and, perhaps most 
crucially of all, as a tool which can assist in organising workers into trade unions (Wills 2002). 
A common denominator across the whole spectrum of existing IFAs (i.e. 72 as of October 
2008) is that all unanimously refer to the rights of trade unions to freely associate (ILO 
Convention n. 87) and bargain collectively (ILO Convention n. 98). Whilst these core 
conventions can be found in almost every corporate code of conduct, the unilateral mode of 
implementation of such instruments has meant that, until recently, trade unions have been 
generally excluded from the processes of social compliance much to the detriment of trade 
union rights in the apparel sector in particular. For a period, the ITGLWF was compelled to 
view codes of conduct as a ‘necessary evil’ and to use the trade union rights provisions in the 
same as levers in the resolution of urgent appeal cases, particularly those involving 
victimisation, retrenchments of union officials and the use of compensation sums to fend off 
the return of reinstated union officials. During the last 5 years, the ITGLWF has moved 
resolutely to develop relationships at a global level, in some cases via joint involvement in 
multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the MFA Forum and the Ethical Trading Initiative, and 
with some major retailers and brand-owners including NIKE, NEXT and GAP to involve its 
affiliates in these companies’ compliance efforts (Miller 2004). 
In 2005, following joint work on a relief scheme to support the victims of a factory 
collapse in Bangladesh, the ITGLWF and Inditex moved towards the signing of an IFA which 
was finally concluded in October 2007. Tangential to the pursuit of an IFA with a MNC the 
ITGLWF, primarily through the late Secretary General Neil Kearney, was actively promoting 
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an approach to resolving labour disputes and advancing core labour standards in garment and 
apparel transnational supply chains. In a speech entitled ‘Life beyond Codes’ Kearney made 
the following comment: 
 
Given the results to date we are convinced that the industrial relations 
route provides the key to sustainable labour standards compliance 
through supply chains.  We see the traditional application of codes of 
conduct through auditing as being merely diagnostic with the 
enterprises involved requiring support to develop mature industrial 
relations systems and training for both management and workforce to 
make them function effectively.  We believe that this will be a much 
more efficient use of resources than the current obsession with 
policing through inadequate social auditing. (ITGLWF, 2007c) 
 
The development of the mature systems approach can be traced back to the resolution 
of a number of trade union rights violations amongst Inditex suppliers in Bangladeshi, 
Cambodian and Peruvian garment factories which took place between 2005 and 2008. It was 
articulated in a series of speeches and press releases by Kearney, and can be summarised as 
consisting of six core elements: a recognition of the need to rationalise the plethora of codes of 
conduct governing the sector; an acknowledgement of the weakness of social auditing; a 
prioritisation of the ‘enabling rights’ of freedom of association and collective bargaining; the 
establishment of the primacy of the employment relationship between a supplier and its 
employees; the redundancy of any role for an NGO in the workplace; and finally an 
appreciation of the relationship between productivity increases and the existence of sound 
workplace relations (Miller, Turner and Grinter 2008). 
The resolution of the aforementioned disputes led to the introduction of management 
systems – agreements specifying trade union recognition, grievance, disciplinary and disputes 
procedures, and training – in an attempt to lay the basis for more sustainable local compliance 
and the eventual abandonment of auditing models. Resorting to and invoking ‘mature systems 
of industrial relations’ has now become such a recurrent feature in the relationship between 
the ITGLWF and Inditex that such an approach can be understood as the most evident 
concretisation of the only IFA in outsourced apparel supply chains (FNV Mondial 2008). 
 
 
The IFA at River Rich  
 
Whilst IFAs have begun to attract a great deal of attention (Stevis and Boswell 2007, 
Papadakis 2008), with few exceptions,2 little is known about their implementation 
mechanisms and outcomes, or the ways in which company signatories respect ethical 
commitments to freedom of association and collective bargaining in the global South. The 
ITGLWF’s approach to the implementation of its IFA requires absolute employer support of 
the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining which, arguably, can only 
come from some form of ‘higher’ commitment cemented in a formal agreement. In this paper 
we utilise a case study approach to gain a richer understanding of what the IFA means in 
practice, particularly in the context of Cambodia. More specifically, the case of River Rich 
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illustrates how a recognition dispute was ultimately resolved with the introduction of systems 
of industrial relations. The case and the analysis are informed by semi-structured interviews 
with Cambodian trade unionists and union activists, ILO officers, arbitral awards, official 
press releases, NGOs campaign material and e-mail correspondence with the ITGLWF, 
Inditex SA, H&M and River Rich. By tracing the history of the labour disputes at the 
Cambodian knitwear factory River Rich and appraising their resolution through two 
successive industrial relations agreements, in the remainder of this paper we unravel the 
constitutive elements, scope and effects of this enhanced approach to social compliance. 
 
 
SOCIAL COMPLIANCE AT RIVER RICH  
Located in Khandal province, and established in 2005, River Rich is a garment factory 
primarily engaged in the production, linking and finishing of knitwear, caps, scarves, socks 
and gloves for the European market.3 The factory was purchased by its main trading partner in 
July 2006 for the sum of US$ 6.9 million, and is now one of the six wholly owned production 
facilities of the Hong Kong based Group Addchance Holdings Limited. Addchance’s 
acquisition of River Rich was primarily motivated by a desire to reduce dependency on 
subcontractors, the need to enhance the capacity to cater for increased demand of finished 
knitted goods and the strategic requirement of reducing the risks arising from EU and US 
quota restrictions placed on knitted goods originating from its four Chinese operations 
(Addchance 2006b). Shortly after purchasing River Rich, Addchance proposed and finalised 
the acquisition of another Cambodian knitwear factory, and in October 2006 it became the 
proprietor of Winner Knitting Factory. 
The ownership of River Rich reflects the historical pattern of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) within the Cambodian garment industry which accelerated from the mid-1990s. At the 
time, with a more stable economy and incentives offered for greenfield investment and 
acquisitions of state owned enterprises, Asian investors from Hong-Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia 
and Singapore began to open factories producing textile and garments (Arnold 2006: 7). Even 
with the imposition of export quotas as part of the Trade Agreement on Textile and Apparel 
(TATA) signed in January 1999, the growth and investment in the industry continued apace. 
By 2005, the ILO estimated that over 200 garment factories were present in Cambodia, 
accounting for 12% of the country’s GDP and 80% of its exported goods (Better Factories 
Cambodia 2005). When these statistics were compiled, only 10% of the factories were in 
Cambodian ownership. As indicated by Frost and Ho (2006: 41): ‘Hong Kong and Taiwan 
account for the ownership of nearly half of the factories in the sector.’ The pattern of 
ownership is also mirrored in the membership composition of the largest employers group in 
Cambodia, the Garment Manufacturing Association of Cambodia (GMAC), which is 
dominated by manufacturers from Hong Kong and Taiwan (i.e. 51.02%) and of which River 
Rich is a member.4 
Formally registered as an export processing garment enterprise, River Rich is subject to 
social compliance inspections under the ILO Better Factories Cambodia (BFC).5 The ILO 
labour monitoring programme – a programme unique to Cambodia – originated from the 
TATA which made provisions on export quota allocation dependent upon compliance with 
Cambodian labour law (10 January 1997) and ILO core labour standards. Prior to the expiry 
of the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) social compliance through the BFC monitoring and 
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reporting mechanisms was voluntary, however it was also ‘encouraged’ by a Prakas 
(implementing decree) issued by the Ministry of Commerce which linked access to the US 
market to BFC inspections (FIAS 2005: 3).  When the MFA ended in January 2005, the 
ministerial decree became redundant and participation in the ILO programme became a 
condition for the concession of an export license (Better Factories Cambodia, nd). 
Given its relatively young age, the River Rich factory appears only in two out the 
twenty-one bi-annual synthesis reports published by the BFC, namely Report n. 17 released in 
October 2006 and Report n. 19 published exactly a year later. From 2001 up to March 2006 
(Report n. 16), the publicly available BFC synthesis reports provided an aggregate summary of 
the audit findings against core labour standards and gave details on the uptake of the 
recommendations made to each factory. River Rich however joined the ILO programme when 
the BFC introduced new computerised auditing systems (i.e. Information Management 
Systems) and new reporting policies. In accordance with the new reporting procedures, the 
reports issued after March 2006 only provide aggregate auditing scores; this means that the 
names of labour rights violators (and persistent violators) are no longer accessible. Such change 
effectively makes the new BFC significantly less transparent. A more substantial critique was 
articulated by C.CAWDU (Coalition of Cambodian Apparel Worker’s Democratic Union) 
President who suggested with the introduction of the new reporting mechanisms all the 
employers partaking in the ILO monitoring exercise, even those that discriminate against 
unions, come across as ‘good’.6 Monitoring alone, from the perspective of a local trade union, 
does neither fully ensure the respect of freedom of association, as sanctioned in Cambodia’s 
labour law, nor does it promote social dialogue.7 
Full access to the 500 items checked by the BFC factory advisers and a detailed 
synthesis of the audits’ findings and a summary of audits and the findings is only available to 
the members of the BFC8 (i.e. the 280 Cambodian garment factories partaking in the 
programme and the 32 international buyers who subscribe to the IMS). River Rich main 
buyers, H&M and Inditex, joined the BFC respectively in 2005 and 2008. The BFC is 
expected to avoid audit duplication, reduce the cost of monitoring and enhance the quality 
and effectiveness of social compliance; both companies nonetheless continue to rely on their 
own auditing systems. H&M, for example, keeps its own auditing mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with the H&M Code of Conduct and its environmental provisions9: ‘The 
controls carried out by BFC do not replace H&M’s own monitoring, but BFC’s assessments 
do provide verification of the results of our audits. Moreover, the information provided by the 
BFC facilitates H&M’s initial selection when looking to co-operate with new producers in 
Cambodia’ (H&M 2006: 8). Likewise, the Inditex 2007 Financial Report indicates that 
Tested to Wear social audits have been carried amongst its Cambodian suppliers’ base and 
more audits were planned for 2008 (Inditex 2007: 77-78).  
 
 
RIVER RICH WORKERS: ORGANISING, DISMISSALS AND DISPUTES 
Despite the existence of these overlapping systems of compliance, a number of labour 
disputes and strikes broke out at River Rich immediately after the formation of an 
independent union at the factory. At the time, according to figures collected by the ATNC 
(Asian Transnational Corporation Monitoring Network), the River Rich workforce comprised 
1,748 workers, and as is the case with the majority of the labour force within the Cambodian 
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garment sector over 90% of River Rich workers were women (Cfr: Better Factories Cambodia 
2006). Furthermore, 70 to 80% of the workforce was employed on fixed duration contracts 
(FDCs) despite having worked for the factory for a period ranging from 6 months to 2 years 
(ATNC 2007). Whilst FDCs are permissible under the Cambodian labour law, and are the 
contract type of choice for garment factories’ employers; their usage has dramatically increased 
since the conclusion of the MFA (Arnold, 2008). In interviews conducted by the Clean 
Clothes Campaign with Athit Kong, Vice President of C.CAWDU, and Phereak Ly of the 
women's rights NGO, Womyn's Agenda for Change (WAC) the two Cambodian labour 
activists identified a number of problems with the use of flexible contracts, namely a trade-off 
between freedom of association and flexible contractual agreements, and the leverage FDCs 
concede to employers:   
 
Athit Kong: ‘...Before, workers would be on permanent contracts but 
now lots are employed on one to three month contracts, even if they 
have worked at the same factory for over two years. If workers are on 
temporary contracts, it's really hard to form a union. They will be 
immediately fired or just not get their contracts renewed.’ (CCC 
2007) 
 
Phereak Ly: ‘...It also means workers are under a lot of pressure. If you 
refuse overtime or take sick leave, if you don't meet your targets all the 
time, or try to speak out about your problems, they say you are not a 
good worker and won't renew your contract.’ (CCC 2007) 
 
Workers at River Rich were eager to unionise primarily to put a halt to the 
overwhelming usage of FDCs, the denial of leave permits and miscalculations in wage 
payments.10 On 24 October 2006, a request to hold elections was sent by C.CAWDU to the 
management of River Rich. Despite threats of dismissal to labour activists in the ironing 
section the election took place on 29 October. The ATNC documents that 345 workers 
participated in the elections, 10 male workers and 5 female workers were competing for the 
union’s leadership posts (i.e. President, Vice President and Secretary General), which were 
eventually won by 3 male candidates (ATNC 2007).11 Only three days after the election, River 
Rich dismissed 19 union members and leaders; shortly afterwards another 98 short-term 
workers, including another 11 union activists, were dismissed (See: Table 1) because their 
contracts had allegedly expired and production was low. In response to what was perceived as 











Table 1: Terminations at River Rich 
 
Date No. Workers Dismissed 
31 October 2006 19 
2 to 3 November 2006 97 
3 to 21 November 2006 1 
Total 117 
Source: Compiled by the authors from Cambodia Arbitration Council (2007). 
 
 
An attempt to solve the dispute was facilitated by the Ministry of Labour and 
Vocational Training (MOLVT) but the collective labour dispute dated 24 November failed to 
resolve a number of issues tabled by C.CAWDU. In accordance with Cambodian labour law 
the outstanding issues were referred by the MOLVT to the Arbitration Council. An offshoot 
of the TATA and a brainchild of the ILO, the Council is the only tripartite tribunal in 
Cambodia that deals specifically with labour disputes and issues awards (Adler, Sage and 
Woolcock 2009). In dealing with the River Rich and C.CAWDU dispute, the Council hosted 
hearings in December and issued a non-binding award in January 2005. The award ruled in 
favour of River Rich and recommended against the re-instatement of the union leaders and 
members. In response, C.CAWDU demanded that workers employed for more than two 
months be given a contract of indeterminate duration (Cambodia Arbitration Council 2007). 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND THE PRIVATE SETTLEMENT OF LABOUR 
DISPUTES  
Arnold (2006: 17) suggests that in Cambodia ‘it is typical for workers to appeal 
directly to international buyers when they experience problems in their factory’’; the President 
of C.CAWDU clarified that when workers are unionised and all the local remedies have been 
unsuccessfully exhausted, unions call for solidarity actions. In attempting to resolve the 
dispute at River Rich, C.CAWDU appealed to cross-border solidarity as it did earlier on in 
the year to draw attention to ongoing union discrimination at Goldfame Enterprises 
International Knitters. The ITGLWF was hence alerted of the situation and, in January 2007, 
made contacts with River Rich main buyers (ITGLWF 2007a). Both H&M and Inditex were 
made aware of the union’s demands, which included the reinstatement of thirty dismissed 
union members, permanent employment status for workers with more than two months 
seniority, the provision of written and comprehensible employment contracts and the 
payment of maternity allowance for the whole period of confinement. Failure to investigate 
the disputes and consider the workers’ demands would have ushered allegations of breaches of 
the companies’ respective codes of conduct and potentially damage the reputation of the Zara 
and H&M brands. However, the types of interventions adopted by the buyers differed 
significantly. H&M agreed with the jurisdiction of the Council and preferred not to get 
involved (ITGLWF 2007a). Inditex, on the other hand, was persuaded by the ITGLWF 
General Secretary to bypass the Arbitral award and hold talks with C.CAWDU and the 
management of River Rich. 
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On 3 February 2007, the ITGLWF and representatives of Inditex met with the 
supplier, the union and the Cambodian arbitrators. The meetings resulted in a formal 
agreement which contained a series of short-term and long-term commitments. River Rich 
agreed to immediately re-instate the 30 trade unionists as of March 2007, and to drop all legal 
charges mounted against them. They furthermore undertook to re-train the 30 workers, and 
upon reinstatement, begin dialogue, consultation and negotiation with C.CAWDU in 
accordance with industrial relations practice. The agreement reached by the parties provided 
for trade union recognition and the development of dialogue, consultation and training on 
industrial relations. In the long-term, the ITGLWF promised to offer the union assistance in 
mentoring and training activities with the view on establishing a joint trade unions council in 
the factory, whilst Inditex, as a principal buyer, pledged to undertake periodic reviews and 
finance training activities for the management and workers. Moreover, River Rich in 
conjunction with Inditex committed to undertake an analysis of the use of workers on short-
term contracts with a view to eliminate such practice (ITGLWF 2007b). 
The fourth clause in the agreement’s addendum deserves some attention because it 
introduces the scope of the intervention and specifies its constitutive elements. These 
included: trade union recognition; daily briefings on production and other problems and 
objectives; fortnightly meetings on general industrial relations matters including working 
conditions, productivity and training; a procedure for handling grievances and complaints and 
a procedure for the handling of disciplinary action. With these elements in place, the spirit of 
the agreement was to render River Rich ‘a viable, profitable and internationally competitive 
enterprise based on good working practices in accordance with Cambodian labour law and 
international labour standards’. 
River Rich did not uphold the February commitments and, throughout May, four 
strikes were organised outside the factory gates demanding the immediate reinstatement of the 
workers. The last strike, staged on May 21, 2007, was by far the largest and most violent: it 
involved approximately 1000 workers and was met by 150 riot police equipped with tear gas, 
guns, electric batons and shields (LIDACHO 2007). The commotion of the event prompted 
an alliance of Hong-Kong based NGOs, international NGOs (i.e. Clean Clothes Campaign), 
and local and international unions to join forces in an effort to put an end to the trade unions’ 
rights violations at River Rich. The ATNC Monitoring Network – an alliance comprising 20 
labour and human rights organisations and trade unions in 12 Asian countries, including 2 
labour organisations in Cambodia – co-ordinated the campaign in close co-operation with 
C.CAWDU. The ATNC website was employed as a vehicle to monitor and later condemn 
the violations.  
The urgency of the appeal and the direct allegations made by the ATNC against the 
ZARA brand and H&M required a second intervention. In early June, the ITGLWF went 
back to Cambodia and arranged a meeting with the management of the Addchance group, the 
management of River Rich, Inditex SA, a representative of H&M, C.CAWDU and GMAC. 
During the 3-day long meeting the February agreement was re-affirmed12 and a number of 
additional provisions were stipulated, namely the immediate permanent reinstatement of the 
30 workers with payments of average earnings since the day of dismissal, the cessation of legal 
action against the dismissed workers, the gradual phasing out of short-duration contracts 
across the whole workforce, and promotion of ‘good industrial relations’ through training and 
dialogue (ITGLWF 2007b). 
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The IFA at River Rich: A Victory for Workers Rights? 
 
Taking stock of the outcomes following signature of the second agreement between 
CCAWDU and River Rich management, what gains have been made for the workers at the 
factory? In the immediate aftermath of the agreement there were some recognisable 
developments and victories for the workers and union members at River Rich. Indeed, parts of 
the agreement have been respected and out of the 30 union members that were offered re-
instatement, 25 accepted the offer, whilst the other 5 found employment elsewhere. In line 
with the stipulations, all the workers who returned to work at River Rich received back 
payments in the region of US$ 1,100 (ITUC 2007b: 7). Significantly, all the 2500 workers at 
the plant (See: Table 2) have been given indeterminate contracts, making River Rich one of 
the few garment factories in Cambodia where short-term contracts have been eliminated.13 
Furthermore, shortly after this victory, the ITGLWF planned to negotiate an equivalent 
agreement with River Rich sister company (ITUC 2007b: 7). 
The agreement has also been decisive in enabling the recognition of the right to 
unionise and the initiation of dialogue between the union and management (ITUC 2007b: 7). 
As illustrated in a remark made by Neil Kearney at the World Retail Congress:  
 
In the River Rich enterprise not a single day’s work has been lost in 
the two years since these systems were adopted.  There, trade unions 
consult and recommend how work be allocated between lines, a 
continual source of dispute in the past.  Mature industrial relations 
don’t eliminate problems but it provides a mechanism where these 
can be anticipated, identified and dealt with before they escalate into 
disputes. (ITGLWF 2009) 
 
This was amplified in interviews with trade unionists at River Rich who confirmed 
that dialogue now took place between trade union and management. However, on two 
separate occasions the parties resorted to the Arbitration Council for disputes regarding 
maternity payments, health checks and redundancies, confirming that potential conflicts of 
interest still remained but that the parties were resorting to institutional mechanisms rather 
than engaging in industrial action.  
Since June 2007, the membership of C.CAWDU increased by fivefold thus allowing 
the union to numerically gain most representative status at the plant (See: Table 2). The 
union also learned how to call upon national and transnational support and to organise 
industrial actions. Furthermore, C.CAWDU earned a favourable reputation amongst garment 
workers in Khandal. As the President of C.CAWDU recalls: ‘...it was a very organised 
campaign which involved local union leaders, industrial action, media and the intervention of 
Inditex. It was important to win at River Rich, C.CAWDU became known in other factories 
as well.’14  An additional outcome of the process was that CAWDU and C.CAWDU acquired 
negotiating skills all valuable for future negotiation rounds with the management and the 
buyers.15 So far, however, attempts to initiate new bargaining rounds have been ‘delayed’ by 





Table 2: River Rich Today 
 
Workers Workers’ Gender Unions C.CAWDU members C.CAWDU 
gender 









90% of union 
members at River 
Rich are women. 
 





Although positive direct and indirect effects ensued from the recognition disputes and 
their subsequent resolution, a number of substantive areas addressed in the IFA and by 
references to the ETI Base Code and the Inditex Code of Conduct remain unresolved, namely 
aspects of health and safety within the workplace and the payment of a ‘living wage’ and non-
wage benefits. Union leaders and activists interviewed as part of this research were asked about 
the working conditions at the factory and they identified ‘excessive heat’ and ‘dust’ as being 
persistent health and safety problems which the management was made aware of but had not 
acted upon. They also indicated that wages, maternity leave payments and health check 
expenses were issues of concern. All the union activists unanimously agreed that the minimum 
wage rate should be increased to US$ 82 per month from the national minimum rate of US$ 
50 as of March 2009.16 The average pay of US$ 72 (inclusive of overtime, housing allowance 
and seniority bonus) was below what the workers perceived as an adequate ‘living wage’ to 
satisfy their needs and those of their dependants and families. Even though we were unable to 
determine whether the piece rate had been lowered or the workload increased, average wages 
have remained the same since the second agreement was concluded in 2007 (See: Marston 
2007: 5). The demand for a minimum wage increase is obviously an issue which a relationship 
between a multinational and a global union as articulated via an IFA cannot hope to address 
single-handedly. Nevertheless, the IFA does expressly lay down the following:  
 
External manufacturers, suppliers and their subcontractors shall 
ensure that wages paid for a standard working week shall meet, at a 
minimum, at least the legal or industry benchmark standards, 
whichever is higher. In any event, wages should always be enough to 
meet the basic needs of workers and their families and to provide 
some discretionary income.17  
 
The ability of the union to bargain at plant level for higher piece rates and other wage 
elements is, however, circumscribed by the employer’s ability to pay, which, in turn, is a 
function of the buying practices operating within the commercial department at Inditex and 
other multinational retailers sourcing from River Rich. We will return to this point in our 
concluding remarks.  
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Some interviewees asserted that the agreements signed at River Rich are ‘far too 
complex for Cambodia.’18 According to ILO officials, unions might be compelled to sign an 
agreement which seeks to resolve immediate concerns (e.g. unfair dismissal and reinstatement) 
but might not have the capacity to use it effectively after the immediate resolution of 
industrial disputes. This is a particularly important point which reinforces, as stipulated in the 
agreement, the need to provide unions and management with training in industrial relations 
and social compliance. However, three years after the agreement was signed, training has not 
been provided and questions are being raised as to who should conduct it and finance it.19 In 
Cambodia, both the trade union movement and management are still relatively inexperienced 
as far as day-to-day dispute resolution is concerned, a factor which could not insignificantly be 
accelerated by training input.  
The current financial crisis has, moreover, brought into sharp focus the fickle nature of 
apparel sourcing and the limited authority CSR departments have in commercial decision 
making. At the time of our interviews the global crisis had impacted upon order placements, 
threatening employment security and the victories secured since the stipulation of the 
agreements. Reflecting the deep impact of the crisis in the Cambodian apparel sector,20 orders 
from Inditex at River Rich had slumped, a situation mirrored at a plant in Peru where a 
similar intervention by Inditex and the ITGLWF had resulted in the establishment of an 
industrial relations framework (Miller, forthcoming). Clearly, sourcing policy and purchasing 
practices21 are variables over which the IFA approach, at present, has very little say. The 
impact of buying practices on staffing decisions are difficult to isolate during a period of 
economic downturn, however we were informed by the River Rich trade union committee 
that a number of workers with indeterminate contracts had been laid off22 and replaced by 
agency workers at times of sudden peaks in orders.  At the time of our interviews it was 
reported that 50 casual workers had been offered intermittent work across various departments 
at River Rich.23 In such circumstances, putting a halt to flexibilisation and casualisation 
through trade union pressure becomes problematic. The extent to which the crisis had led to a 
form of concession bargaining was unclear but union leaders admitted to having avoided 
confrontation with management out of fear that production would be shifted to a River Rich 
sister plant (i.e. Winner Knitting Factory), with more jobs lost as a result.24 
The sustainability of strong industrial relations is heavily dependent on the existing 
commercial relationship flourishing between the supplier in question and the signatory of the 
IFA, and that such a relationship is one where the buyer has a significant percentage of the 
production at the supplier’s facility. In a volatile sourcing environment such as apparel, the 
IFA can become a transient mode of compliance since there is no guarantee that Inditex will 
continue sourcing from River Rich, and consequently that River Rich would comply with the 
conditions negotiated with Inditex and C.CAWDU. From the perspective of the trade unions, 
should C.CAWDU lose its most representative status within the plant – a 51% union 
membership – the agreement does not stipulate whether the same ‘entitlements’ and 
conditions would be re-negotiated with or extended to a different union or a union not 
affiliated to either C.CAWDU or the ITGLWF. Such observations would appear to suggest 
that an IFA, along with other voluntary forms of supply chain governance, may only have 
purchase under conditions of a long-term strategic supply agreement between a buyer and a 
supplier. Because of the fickle and segmented nature of the global fashion market, such supply 
agreements are likely in what might be termed the ‘basics’ market niche. At present, supply 
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agreements between multinationals and their commercial partners are however some way off 





In this paper we have attempted to further the debate on alternative approaches to 
global social compliance by critically assessing the application of the only IFA in the apparel 
sector. By charting the labour dispute at River Rich the paper has sought to determine what 
the IFA means in practice, the point at which it was engaged and by whom, and the outcomes 
it produced in this instance. We found that the introduction of industrial relations agreements 
at River Rich were not effected as a proactive measure, anticipated by any existing instrument 
of social compliance, but followed a series of labour disputes, industrial action and 
international campaigns that caused significant disruptions to production and threatened to 
tarnish the reputation of two global brands. Although a system for managing industrial 
relations was negotiated in the first instance, the supplier did not abide by the agreement and 
a local union had to make a repeated call for international solidarity action and enlist the 
assistance of a global union and a coalition of labour rights organisations to remedy a 
recognition dispute.   
The most visible impacts of the intervention by Inditex and the ITGLWF were 
undoubtedly a final recognition of C.CAWDU and the elimination of FDCs. However, 
despite a provision in the agreement, to date there has been no training provision for the 
union representatives at River Rich. Furthermore, the absence of orders from Inditex to River 
Rich during much of 2010, a situation mirrored elsewhere in the multinational’s supply chain, 
not only highlights the fragile nature of the achievements at this factory, but throws into 
question one of pillars of the mature systems of industrial relations approach pursued by the 
ITGLWF, namely the primacy of the employment relationship. In the globalised world of 
outsourced apparel production, to what extent can an employment relationship based on 
collective agreements withstand the commercial forces at work in an apparel supply chain 
where the terms of trade are heavily dictated by the buyers? Inditex and H&M both operate in 
a highly competitive retail environment which not only has major implications for the 
organisation of production but also undoubted potential impacts on the sustainability of 
industrial relations established by absentee third parties in supplier factories. 
In many respects, in shifting from the national to the global, nothing has changed in 
the trade union approach to industrial relations, with priority focusing in the first instance on 
procedural matters in order to address ongoing substantive issues. For the ITGLWF, this is the 
central plank of its mature systems of industrial relations approach: it draws attention to the 
violation of fundamental worker rights as laid down in codes of conduct as a lever to achieving 
trade union recognition to then introduce management systems in supplier factories. In this 
respect, a global union seeking to implement an IFA is no different from a global union 
seeking to enforce a multinational’s code of conduct, although the nature of the relationship 
and understanding between the officers of a global union and their CSR counterparts may 
differ in these two scenarios.  The River Rich case highlights, above all else, the need to extend 
the ‘frontier of control’ into the area of buying practices in order to protect workers from the 
substantive insecurities arising from sourcing decisions made by other quarters in a 
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multinational. In many respects this is as much a battle which corporate social responsibility 
managers as well as trade unionists need to wage. We would argue that long-term supply 
agreements between multinationals and their external suppliers need to be on the framework 
agreement bargaining agenda of global unions in such manufacturing environments. In the 
volatile world of ‘fast’ fashion this will be a tough but necessary call.  
Furthermore, as the ITGLWF seeks further IFAs with other MNCs and develops 
relationships between global retailers, brand-owners and ITGLWF affiliates, Bronfenbrenner 
(2007: 218) is right to remind us that the authority of an IFA ‘...is only as good as the power 
of the multilevel grassroots networks of workers and their allies in labour organizations and 
NGOs to enforce those agreements, through local, national and international action’. This 
perspective would necessitate a greater focus in disseminating the provisions of the IFA 
amongst affiliates and workers’ networks in the global South. At a time when union resources 
are scarce and international donors scale back, the task of dissemination will be a challenging 
one, but one which hopefully the planned new manufacturing global union between the 
International Metalworkers Federation, the International Federation of Chemical, Energy 
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1These are the Clean Clothes Campaign, the Ethical Trading Initiative, the Fair Labour 
Association, the Fair Wear Foundation, Social Accountability International and the Workers’ 
Rights Consortium.  
 
2To the authors’ knowledge the only academic studies that provide an evaluation of two IFAs 
are Jane Wills (2002) and Lone Riisgard (2005). 
 
3Sales made to H&M and Inditex accounted for approximately HK$384.8 million, which 
represented approximately 85.4% of the Group’s sales of knitted sweaters for the year 2006 
(Addchance 2006a). 
 
4Once a factory is formally registered it also must become a member of GMAC.  
 




6Interview with C.CAWDU President, Phnom Penh, 24 March 2009. 
 
7Interview with Ath Thorn, C.CAWDU President, Phnom Penh, 24 March 2009. It is 
important to add that some trade union activists recognised the value of training in 
negotiation, collective bargaining, most representative status and CSR imparted by the BFC 
and two complementary ILO initiatives operating in Cambodia – the ILO Dispute Resolution 
Project (Phase III) and the ILO Workers’ Education Project. 
 
8Interview with BFC Chief Technical Advisor, Phnom Penh, 23 March 2009. 
 
9Email correspondence with H&M Head of CSR, 26 November 2009. 
 
10Email correspondence with Ath Thorn, C.CAWDU President, 10 January 2010. 
 
11The gender bias in trade union leadership is not isolated to this single case, as recalled by a 
Senior Programme Office at ACILS, only 15% of trade union local leaders in the Cambodian 
garment sector are women while female membership accounts to a staggering 90%. Interview 
with Senior Programme Officer American Center for International Labour Solidarity (ACILS) 
Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 26 April 2009. 
 
12Whilst the first agreement had no legal validity the second agreement was registered with 
MOLVT to allow further disputes to be resolved through Cambodian conciliation and 
arbitration mechanisms (ITGLWF 2007a). 
 
13Interview with An Nan, Arbitrator Cambodian Arbitrator Council and Workers Rights 
Consortium, Phnom Penh, 23 March 2009. 
 
14Interview with Ath Thorn, C.CAWDU President, Phnom Penh, 24 March 2009. 
 
15Interview with John Richotte, Chief Technical Advisor ILO Dispute Resolution Project, 
Phnom Penh, 23 March 2009. 
 
16This was negotiates nationally in 2006, see: Miller and Williams (2009: 107). 
 
17Annex 1 to the International framework agreement between Industria de Diseño Textil, SA 
and the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers Federation on the 
implementation of international labour standards throughout the Inditex supply chain. 
 
18Interview with John Richotte, Chief Technical Advisor ILO Dispute Resolution Project, 
Phnom Penh, 23 March 2009. And, Interview with Tuomo Poutiainen, Chief Technical 
Advisor ILO Better Factories Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 23 March 2009. 
 
19Interview with Senior Programme Officer ACILS Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 26 April 2009; 
and email correspondence with Ath Thorn, C.CAWDU President, 10 January 2010. 
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20Across the whole Cambodian garment industry there has been a 45% drop in production 
since the financial crisis began. Interview with Mr. Som Chamnan, Executive Manager 
CAMFEBA, Phnom Penh, 27 March 2009. 
 
21Inditex is a company which has pioneered the ‘fast fashion’ retail model which calls for 
reduced lead times and constant modifications to product design. This is an approach which 
can have a short-term impact on production and factory management and is an area which 
needs further empirical research. 
 
22Interview with Ath Thorn, C.CAWDU President, Phnom Penh, 24 March 2009. 
 
23Interviews with CAWDU activists and leadership at River Rich, Khandal, 24 March 2009. 
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